Illinois\u27 Medical Malpractice Review Panel Provision: A Constitutional Analysis by Dynia, Therese
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 17
Issue 2 Winter 1986 Article 5
1986
Illinois' Medical Malpractice Review Panel
Provision: A Constitutional Analysis
Therese Dynia
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Therese Dynia, Illinois' Medical Malpractice Review Panel Provision: A Constitutional Analysis, 17 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 275 (1986).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol17/iss2/5
Comments
Illinois' Medical Malpractice Review
Panel Provision:
A Constitutional Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
The early 1970's marked the beginning of what has often been
called a medical malpractice crisis. ' As the frequency and severity
of malpractice claims against physicians and hospitals increased
rapidly on a nationwide basis,2 and as the amounts of judgments
grew larger, insurance carriers became increasingly reluctant to is-
sue malpractice policies. Those carriers who continued to issue
such policies demanded dramatically increased premiums.' Some
health care providers, faced with rising costs, were forced to curtail
or terminate their services.4 Many states feared that the availabil-
ity of health care services would decline and that doctors would
practice without insurance, thus leaving injured patients with the
prospect of uncollectible judgments.'
1. See Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 27 J. L. &
ECON. 115 (1984); Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance
Crisis.- Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 759-60 (1977); Note, Virginia's
Medical Malpractice Act: A Constitutional Analysis, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1192,
1198 n.47 (1980).
2. See Danzon, supra note 1, at 115. In this context "severity" is the average dollar
indemnity per paid claim, including court awards and payments in out-of-court settle-
ments. Id.
3. See The Problems of Insuring Medical Malpractice; Hearing Before the Subcommit-
tee on Health of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on Examination of
the Continuing Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 184, 186
(1975); Comment, Gouldin v. Gouldin, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis, 3
OHIO N.U.L. REV. 510 (1975); Note, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels, 42 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 939, 941 (1981).
4. Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 301, 402 N.E.2d 560, 562 (1979) (discusses
background of 1975 medical malpractice crisis and the decision which held the 1975
Illinois legislation unconstitutional; see infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text); U.S.
DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COM-
MISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 39, 73-88 (1973) (hereinafter cited as REPORT ON
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE); ILLINOIS INSURANCE LAWS STUDY COMMISSION, FINAL
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND 79TH GEN. ASSEMBLY 47-60 (1975); ABA REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 77-79 (1977).
5. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 152, 695 P.2d 665, 680,
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In an effort to respond to the special interests of the doctors,
hospitals, insurance companies - and, ultimately, consumers -
forty-eight states have passed some form of remedial legislation.6
Illinois, in 1975, was one of the first states to enact such legislative
reform. 7 However, the Illinois reform was short-lived. In May
of 1976, the Illinois Supreme Court declared the act
unconstitutional. 8
In 1985 the Illinois General Assembly again passed an act
designed to solve the myriad of problems associated with medical
malpractice. 9 And, once again, an action has been filed which
challenges the constitutionality of the legislation's provisions.10
This note will examine the past and present Illinois medical mal-
practice legislation. It will first discuss the provisions of the 1975
Reform Act and the reasons why the Illinois Supreme Court de-
clared the act unconstitutional. Next, the provisions of the 1985
legislation will be summarized. Focusing on panel review provi-
sions, which are highly controversial and found in both the old and
new acts, the note will discuss judicial treatment of three frequent
constitutional challenges to such provisions. The note will con-
clude with a discussion of how Illinois' new panel review provision
will fare under constitutional challenge.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Medical Malpractice Legislation of 1975
The medical malpractice crisis of the 1970's has been attributed
to many factors, including an increase in the number of medical
claims filed, I I an increase in the dollar amounts of judgments ren-
211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 383 (discusses the medical malpractice crisis of the 1970's), appeal
dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
6. With the exception of Minnesota and West Virginia, every state has passed some
form of medical malpractice legislation. See AMER. MEDICAL Ass'N, DEP'T OF STATE
LEGISLATION, DIV. OF LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES, PRETRIAL SCREENING PANELS (Apr.
1985), COLLATERAL SOURCE PROVISIONS (Mar. 1985), PERIODIC PAYMENTS (Apr.
1985), STANDARD OF CARE AND EXPERT WITNESS QUALIFICATION (Apr. 1985), RES
IPSA LOQUITUR (Apr. 1985), PATIENT COMPENSATION FUND (Apr. 1985) (available
upon request from the American Medical Association).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 7 58.2 to 58.10 (1975) (repealed 1979); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 70, 101 (1975) (repealed 1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, 1 1013(a) (1975) (repealed
1979).
8. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 77 2-114, 2-611.1, 2-622, 2-1010, 2-1012 to 2-1020
(1985).
10. Bernier v. Burris, No. 85-6627 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. Ill. Dec. 19, 1985). See infra
notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
11. A national survey revealed that the number of claims per physician doubled from
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dered, 2 a decrease in trust in doctor-patient relationships,' 3 and an
increase in iatrogenic injuries.' 4 Since no single factor caused the
crisis, early legislative attempts to resolve the problem were diffi-
cult and often unsuccessful.' 5
Illinois, eager to resolve the medical malpractice dilemmas fac-
ing its own physicians, hospitals, insurance companies and con-
sumers, became one of the first states to attempt malpractice
reform. Medical Malpractice Public Act 79-1434 and Medical
Malpractice-Arbitration Public Act 79-1435 (the "1975 Act") be-
came effective November 11, 1975.16 In relevant part, the 1975
Act provided for: (1) the establishment of medical review panels to
screen all medical malpractice cases before trial;' 7 (2) a maximum
approximately 13 per 100 physicians in 1968 to 26 per 100 in 1974. See REPORT ON
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 4, at 6-12.
12. St. Paul Fire Marine Insurance Co. reports that the national average payment for
malpractice claims increased from $6,705 in 1969 to $12,535 in 1974. See CONG. Q. 709
(Apr. 5, 1975); see also REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 4, at 33 (one
percent of all plaintiffs' judgments in 1970 were for amounts in excess of $100,000).
13. See Comment, MICRA and Equal Protection, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829, 849-50
(1979).
Doctors have also blamed the so-called "Marcus Welby" syndrome, whereby
the public has been "media taught" to expect fantastic results from the medical
profession. When less-than-perfect results are achieved, the disappointed pa-
tient views the doctor's services as substandard and the patient's reactions often
result in malpractice suits. Other analysts assert that the effect of modern tech-
nology on the practice of medicine has led to the breakdown in the traditional
physician-patient relationship. This breakdown weakens the patient's trust of
and admiration for the physician, thus making the subjective decision to sue for
perceived substandard medical service far easier than when greater trust ex-
isted. Those analysts focusing on the rapid advance of medical technology
have also pointed out that the increase in the severity of malpractice claims
made may be due to the proliferation of complex procedures currently being
developed and utilized to combat injury, organ failure and disease.
Id.
14. REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 4, at 24. The U.S. Department
of Health, Education and Welfare identifies the increase in injuries incurred during medi-
cal treatment as the root cause of the medical malpractice crisis. Id.
15. See State ex rel. Glennon Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo.
1979) (declaring Missouri medical malpractice act unconstitutional); Arneson v. Olson,
270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) ($300,000 maximum malpractice recovery provision and
requirement that physicians obtain malpractice insurance violate equal protection and
due process); Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (C.P. 1976)
(Ohio malpractice law violates equal protection); Simon v. Saint Elizabeth Medical
Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (C.P. 1976) (compulsory mediation provision
violates equal protection; admissibility of arbitration panel findings at subsequent trial
violates right to trial by jury).
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 1 58.2 to 58.10 (1975) (repealed 1979); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 70, 1 101 (1975) (repealed 1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, 1 1013(a) (1975)
(repealed 1979).
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 110, 11 58.2 to 58.10 (1975) (repealed 1979).
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recovery of $500,000 for all losses and damages sustained by rea-
son of medical, hospital or other healing art malpractice; 8 and (3)
regulation of medical malpractice insurance rates on policies in
existence on June 10, 1975.19
1. Review Panels
The 1975 Act provided that in all medical malpractice cases, the
circuit judge would, within 120 days to a year after the filing of a
complaint, order the convening of a medical review panel to which
a medical malpractice case would be assigned for a hearing and
determination. 20 The medical review panel would consist of one
circuit court judge, one practicing physician and one practicing at-
torney.2 ' The panelists would be chosen from rosters maintained
by the chief presiding judge of each judicial circuit.2 The rosters
would include at least five circuit judges, at least twenty practicing
physicians, and at least twenty practicing attorneys.23 The 1975
Act provided for assignment from these rosters to the panels on a
rotation basis.24 The parties, by unanimous agreement, could se-
lect as a panelist a physician, an attorney, or a circuit judge whose
name did not appear on the roster.2 5 A panelist could refuse to
serve on the panel or could be disqualified on the basis of conflicts
of interest.26
Proceedings before the panel were to be adversary. Each party
could call and cross-examine witnesses and introduce evidence as
at a trial in the circuit court.27 The panel had the power to sub-
poena, call witnesses, examine evidence, call for additional or par-
ticular evidence and examine or cross-examine witnesses. 28 The
circuit judge was to preside over the proceedings and decide proce-
dural and evidentiary matters while all other matters were to be
determined by the panel. 29 The panel was to make a determination
on the issue of liability and, if liability was found, on the issue of
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, T 101 (1975) (repealed 1979).
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, % 1013(a) (1975) (repealed 1979).
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 58.3 (1975) (repealed 1979).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 58.4.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 58.5.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 58.6.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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fair and just compensation for damages.3 °
The effect of a panel's decision depended on the parties involved
in the suit. If the parties agreed in writing to be bound by the
determination of the panel, the panel's decision would be binding
and conclusive, and judgment would be entered thereon.3' If the
parties did not agree to be bound by the panel's determination, the
panel judge would conduct a pretrial conference and the case
would proceed to trial as in any other civil case. 32 The determina-
tion of the panel was not admissible at any subsequent trial in the
circuit court.33
The expenses of the medical review panel were to be appor-
tioned equally among the parties, except where a unanimous panel
decision was rejected by a party losing at the subsequent trial.34 In
this instance, a trial court could in its discretion impose attorney
fees and litigation costs on the losing party.35
2. Maximum Recovery and Regulation of Medical Malpractice
Insurance Rates
In response to spectacular jury awards 36 and rising insurance
costs, 37 Illinois chose to place a ceiling on the amount recoverable
in medical malpractice actions. The 1975 Act provided that a
plaintiff was entitled to a maximum recovery of $500,000 in any
medical malpractice action.3 s
Furthermore, in an attempt to regulate the increasing costs of
medical malpractice insurance so that physicians and hospitals
would be better able to pay insurance premiums, 39 restrictions were
placed on insurance companies.4° The 1975 Act prohibited a medi-
cal malpractice insurance company from refusing to renew existing
policies at rates established on June 10, 1975, unless the company
30. Id. at 58.7.
31. Id. at 58.8.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 58.9.
35. Id.
36. See Linster, Malpractice: Striking The Reasonable Balance, 43 INS. COUNS. J. 101
(1976). Until 1975, Chicago had never had a malpractice verdict larger than $250,000
against a physician. In 1976, there were three malpractice jury awards in excess of
$1,000,000 and one such verdict for $2,500,000. Id. ; see also Rathnau, The Illinois Medi-
cal Malpractice Acts: Response to Crisis, 65 ILL. B.J. 716, 725 (1977).
37. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 101 (1975) (repealed 1979).
39. See supra note 12. The increase in judgments awarded to malpractice victims has
been linked to an increase in insurance premiums. See Comment, supra note 13, at 849.
40. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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provided evidence sufficient to justify a rate increase.4"
B. Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Association 42
In May 1976, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Wright v. Central
DuPage Hospital Association,4 3 declared the 1975 Act unconstitu-
tional. The Wright case was a consolidation of separate declara-
tory judgment actions." In relevant part, the plaintiffs contended
that the regulations imposed on insurance companies were uncon-
stitutional since the provisions denied the companies the equal pro-
tection and due process rights guaranteed under the fourteenth
amendment of the federal Constitution and under section 2 of arti-
cle 1 of the Illinois constitution. 4  Additionally, the plaintiffs al-
leged that the imposition of a medical review panel prior to trial
and the maximum damage recovery of $500,000 violated their con-
stitutional rights to trial by jury and free access to the courts.46
With respect to the regulations imposed on medical malpractice
insurance companies, the provision was held unconstitutional on
special legislation grounds.47 Since the provision regulated only
policies that were in existence on June 10, 1975, and not those
written after that date, the legislation represented a special law in
violation of section 13 of article IV of the Illinois constitution.4"
The Wright court also invalidated the medical review panel re-
quirement. The court found that the panel empowered nonjudi-
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, 1013(a) (1975) (repealed 1979).
42. 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
43. Id. The Wright decision has been extensively discussed by other state courts as
well as by commentators. See, e.g., Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir.
1979); Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Eastin v. Broom-
field, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976);
State ex rel. Schneider v. Liggett, 223 Kan. 610, 576 P.2d 221 (1978); McGuffey v. Hall,
557 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1977); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978); Attorney
Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass.
645, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977);
Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976); Parker v. Children's Hosp.,
483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261
N.W.2d 434 (1978); see also Redish, supra note 1, at 794-95; Comment, Constitutional
Challenges to Medical Malpractice Panels: A Constitutional Analysis, 46 FORDHAM L.
REV. 322, 329-31 (1977); Note, Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Association: A Grim
Prognosis for Medical Malpractice Review Panels?, 22 S.D.L. REV. 461 (1977).
44. 63 II1. 2d at 317-18, 347 N.E.2d at 737.
45. Id. at 330, 347 N.E.2d at 744. Plaintiffs argued also that the provision unlawfully
delegated legislative authority in violation of section 104 of article IV of the Illinois con-
stitution and that the provision impaired the obligation of contract in violation of section
16 of article 1 of the Illinois constitution. Id.
46. Id. at 318, 347 N.E.2d at 739.
47. Id. at 330-31, 347 N.E.2d at 744.
48. Id.
280 [Vol. 17
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cial members of the medical review panel with judicial functions in
violation of sections 1 and 9 of article VI of the Illinois constitu-
tion.4 9 Additionally, the panels impaired the plaintiffs' constitu-
tionally protected interests in trial by jury.50 However, it is
important to note that the court stated that by invalidating the in-
stant provisions of the medical malpractice review panel, it did not
"imply that a valid pretrial panel procedure cannot be devised." '5'
Finally, the court declared the maximum recovery provision un-
constitutional. The court stated that the provision was arbitrary5 2
since it denied full recovery to the very seriously injured malprac-
tice victim while not providing him a concomitant quid pro quo.53
49. Id. at 322, 347 N.E.2d at 740. Although the statute provided that the circuit
judge member of the medical review panel "shall preside over all proceedings of the panel
and shall determine all procedural issues, including matters of evidence," ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, 58.6 (1975) (repealed 1979), all other issues, both factual and legal, were
to be decided by the lawyer, physician and judge; thus the same judicial power was vested
in all three panel members. Under the provisions of the statute, "the physician and law-
yer members of the medical review panel were empowered to make conclusions of law
and fact 'according to the applicable substantive law' . . . over the dissent of the circuit
judge." Wright, 68 Ill. 2d at 322, 347 N.E.2d at 740 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch 110,
58.7 (1975) (repealed 1979)); see also Comment, supra note 13, at 868-72 (discussing the
Wright decision in light of subsequent legislation and caselaw in other jurisdictions).
50. 63 Ill. 2d at 325, 347 N.E.2d at 741. "The right of trial by jury as it existed at
common law is the right to have the facts in controversy determined, under the direction
and superintendence of a judge, by the unanimous verdict of twelve impartial jurors
... " Id. at 324, 347 N.E.2d at 740 (citing People v. Lobb, 17 Ill. 2d 287, 298-99
(1959)). The court concluded that the panel procedure was an impermissible restriction
on the right to trial by jury guaranteed by article 1, section 13, of the Illinois constitution.
Id.
51. Id.
52. 63 Ill. 2d at 327, 347 N.E.2d at 743. In Wright, the plaintiff argued that the
$500,000 damage limitation created an arbitrary classification and unreasonably discrimi-
nated against "the most seriously injured victims of medical malpractice." Id. at 325,
347 N.E.2d at 741. Defendants responded that such "unequal treatment [was] necessary
to deal with . . . the 'medical malpractice crisis' " and that it was within the legislature's
power to set limits on plaintiffs' recoveries even if the result was to deny some plaintiffs
full compensation. To support their contentions, defendants compared the malpractice
legislation to the limits set in Dramshop Act and Wrongful Death Act recoveries. Id. at
326, 347 N.E.2d at 741-42. The court distinguished the medical limitation from wrongful
death and dramshop recoveries because the latter acts were "creature(s) of the General
Assembly" and could thus be limited by that body. However, medical malpractice ac-
tions existed at common law and could not, therefore, be statutorily limited by the legisla-
ture. Id. at 327, 347 N.E.2d at 742.
53. Id. at 327, 347 N.E.2d at 742. Interestingly enough, the court did not hold that
tort plaintiffs had a vested right in a common-law cause of action. In fact, where a quid
pro quo existed, the legislature was not precluded from abolishing a common-law rem-
edy. The court noted, for example, that provisions limiting monetary recoveries in
worker's compensation cases were valid since, in exchange for limits on damages, the
injured party was awarded compensation without regard to the employer's negligence
and the employer was required to relinquish certain defenses. Id.
According to Justice Underwood's dissent, the $500,000 maximum recovery legislation
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 17
C. The Medical Malpractice Legislation of 1985
In 1985, Illinois was once again "accelerating through the first
stages of a crisis in medical malpractice."54 Congested court
rooms,55 frivolous malpractice claims,56 the prevalent use of "de-
fensive medicine," 57 and the increases in jury damage awards58 and
insurance rates59 caused the Illinois legislature again to attempt
represented a valid exercise of legislative discretion. Justice Underwood found that the
legislature had the power, within constitutional limits, to restrict or even eliminate com-
mon-law rights, regardless of a concomitant quid pro quo. For Justice Underwood, the
more troublesome question was whether the legislation was enacted without any rational
basis. Because he felt that serious problems did exist in the medical malpractice field and
that the legislation might, in some "imprecise" manner, assure adequate health care at a
reasonable cost, Justice Underwood did not hold the legislation unconstitutional. Id. at
333-35, 347 N.E.2d at 745-46 (Underwood, J., dissenting); see also Comment, supra note
13, at 868-72 (discussing the Wright decision at length).
54. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TO GOVERNOR
JAMES R. THOMPSON (1985) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE]. On November 1, 1984,
Governor Thompson appointed eighteen individuals representing a cross-section of ex-
pertise to a Medical Malpractice Task Force for the purpose of examining the problems
and proposing possible legislative reform. Id. But see Bernier v. Burris, No. 85-6627, slip
op. at 2 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. Ill. Dec. 19, 1985). "There is no empirical data to support
the claim that a medical malpractice insurance crisis exists in the State of Illinois." Id.;
see infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
55. According to an American Medical Association Task Force on Professional Lia-
bility, the number of suits filed tripled in the period 1975 to 1983. Malpractice Reform
Fight Spreads, Chi. Tribune, June 3, 1985, at 1, col 1.
56. See TASK FORCE, supra note 54, at 4. The Task Force noted that a "Medical
Malpractice Claims Study released by the Department of Insurance in 1984 indicated that
of 3,763 malpractice claims closed between 1980 and 1983, only 1,218 were closed with
payment by the defendant. 2,545, or 68%, were settled without payment by the defend-
ant." Id. It was the Task Force's opinion that a significant percentage of the number
closed without payment were, in fact, without merit. Id. But see Bernier v. Burris, No.
85-6627, slip op. at 3 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. Ill. Dec. 19, 1985).
The report in the Medical Malpractice Claims Study, that "[t]wo-thirds of all
claims are closed without any indemnity paid" is misleading. The term "claim"
as used in the study includes every complaint, even a single telephone call, even
though no court action resulted. Thus, the number of claims closed without
any indemnity paid is overstated in the report by over 20%.
Id.; see infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
57. TASK FORCE, supra note 54, at 31. Defensive medicine involves additional tests,
longer stays in hospitals, and consultations with specialists to confirm diagnosis and treat-
ment. The American Medical Association estimates that defensive medicine constitutes
25% of the cost of health care treatment. Id.
58. Id. at 30. In the past nine years the average medical malpractice award has in-
creased, on a national basis, 500%, and in the past eight years the average medical mal-
practice award in Illinois has increased 600%. Id.; Comment, Medical Malpractice: Will
Jumbo Awards Spark Another Insurance Crisis?, 68 A.B.A. J. 1545 (Dec. 1982); Com-
ment, Trends in Million-Dollar Verdicts, 70 A.B.A. J. 52 (Sept. 1984) (certain states are
known for their generous juries; leading the list are New York, California, Florida, and
Texas, followed by Michigan, Illinois and Pennsylvania).
59. See TASK FORCE, supra note 54, at 30. In a report to the Task Force, John
Washburn, the Director of the Illinois Department of Insurance, stated that capacity and
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malpractice reform. On June 20, 1985, the Illinois General Assem-
bly passed House Bill 1604 (the "1985 Act"), which amended the
Code of Civil Procedure.' On June 25, 1985, Governor Thomp-
son approved and signed the bill into law, effective August 15,
1985.61
1. Summary of Provisions
Despite the fact that the 1975 legislation was declared unconsti-
tutional, the 1985 Act in some respects contains even broader pro-
visions. In addition to the review panel provision, which will be
the focus of this article, the 1985 Act includes the following
provisions:
(1) In all medical malpractice cases, affidavits by the plaintiff's
attorney (or the plaintiff, if the proceeding is pro se) are required to
accompany the complaint. The affidavits must certify that the affi-
ant has consulted and reviewed the facts of the case with a health
professional and that, based on the review and a subsequent writ-
ten report prepared by the health professional, the affiant believes
that a "reasonable and meritorious" cause of action exists.62
(2) In all medical malpractice suits in which damages are
affordability problems exist in the Illinois medical insurance industry. Id. "The capacity
problem is evidenced by the relatively small number of companies writing medical mal-
practice coverage, the decreasing availability of higher limits and the decline of reinsur-
ance markets." Id. Illinois currently has three major medical malpractice underwriters:
Illinois State Inter-Insurance Company (underwriting approximately 60% of all medical
malpractice insurance), Medical Protective Insurance Company (underwriting approxi-
mately 20%) and St. Paul Insurance Companies (underwriting approximately 15%). A
fourth medical malpractice underwriter, Medical Protective Insurance, has recently
adopted a plan which offers only low limit policies. Id. at 9.
The affordability problem is evidenced by the dramatic rate increases requested by
medical malpractice insurers and by increased costs of reinsurance. Id. at 30. But see
Bernier v. Burris, No. 85-6627, slip op. at 3 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. Ill. Dec. 19, 1985). "A
sharp decline in the value of investments resulted in a reduction of 'reserves' for the
payment of claims. The funding problems now asserted by the insurers are of their own
making, not the outgrowth of 'unforseeable' increases in the number (frequency) and size
(severity) in malpractice claims." Id.; see infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
60. House Bill 1604 in relevant part amends ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1109, 2-
1205, 8-2001 and 8-2003 and adds 44 2-114, 2-611.1, 2-622, 2-1010, 2-1012 to 2-1020.
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-114, 2-611.1, 2-622, 2-1010, 2-1012 to 2-1020
(1985).
62. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, $ 2-622 (1985). In an effort to weed out frivolous com-
plaints, the focus in this provision is placed on the attorney and reviewing health profes-
sional, who are in better positions to analyze the case and recognize frivolous complaints.
A copy of the written report, clearly identifying the plaintiff and the reasons for the
reviewing health professional's determination that a reasonable and meritorious cause of
action exists, must be attached to the affidavit. Information which identifies the review-
ing health professional may be deleted. In the event that allegations and denials in the
affidavit are found to be untrue or made without reasonable cause, the plaintiff or his
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awarded, the jury must itemize the verdict to reflect the amounts
attributable to the economic and noneconomic loss suffered by the
victim. A further itemization of the economic loss must be made,
reflecting: (a) amounts intended to compensate for necessary
health or rehabilitative services, drugs and therapy; (b) amounts
intended to compensate for lost wages or earning capacity; and (c)
all other economic loss. Each of these subcategories must be fur-
ther subdivided into past and future expenses.63
(3) In all medical malpractice awards, plaintiff's attorney fees
will be structured in the following manner: 33.3% of the first
$150,000, 25% of the next $850,000, and 20% of any amount
awarded over $1,000,000. The court may review contingent fee ar-
rangements for fairness and, in special circumstances, may in-
crease the compensation."4
(4) All punitive damages are abolished.65
(5) An amount equal to the sum of (1) 50% of the benefits
provided for lost wages or disability which become payable to the
injured party as a result of the negligence and (2) 100% of all "col-
lateral" sources of income, such as insurance payments made to an
injured party as a result of the negligence, may be deducted from
the plaintiff's award.66
(6) An election for periodic payments may be made for judg-
ments involving future economic loss. The election pertains only
to damages exceeding $250,000 or 50% of such a judgment, which-
ever is greater.67
attorney is subject to the payment of reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, in-
curred by the other party as a result of the untrue pleading. Id.
63. Id. at 2-1109. The extensive itemization required by the jury is necessary for
the determination of any periodic payments of future damages that may be requested by
the defendant. See Id. at 2-1705; infra note 67 and accompanying text.
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1114 (1985).
65. Id. at 2-1115.
66. Id. at 2-1205. The deductions are qualified as follows:
(a) application to reduce the verdict must be made within 30 days;
(b) the reduction does not extend to any amount that may be recouped through sub-
rogation, trust agreement or otherwise;
(c) the reduction shall not reduce the judgment by more than 50%;
(d) the reduction does not extend to any amounts paid by the plaintiff for insurance
premiums up to two years before the plaintiff's injury; and
(e) the reduction does not apply to any payments for medical expenses directly attrib-
utable to the defendant's negligence. Id.
67. Id. at 7 2-1705 to 2-1718. The election may be made, by one or both parties
involved in the suit, no less than 60 days before the commencement of the trial. Any
objections to such election must be made within 30 days after the election. Id. at 2-
1705. After liability is determined, the trier of fact must establish the periodic install-
ment schedule. Id. at 2-1706. For all future damages awarded for the remainder of the
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(7) In all cases by an original defendant doctor alleging mali-
cious prosecution arising out of medical malpractice claims, the
plaintiff doctor need not prove special damages to sustain a cause
of action.68
2. Review Panels
The review panel requirement is the only provision common to
the 1975 Act and the 1985 Act. The 1985 panel provision resem-
bles the 1975 provision in many respects. 69 As in 1975, the 1985
legislature established review panels consisting of one circuit judge,
one health professional and one practicing attorney. 70 The panels
are to be chosen, by the chief judge of each judicial circuit, 71 from
rosters including at least five circuit judges, at least twenty practic-
ing health professionals and at least twenty practicing attorneys.72
Parties may, by unanimous agreement, choose as a panelist an at-
torney, health professional, or circuit judge not found on the ros-
ter.73 A panel member can refuse to serve on the panel or can be
disqualified on the basis of conflicts of interest.74
Proceedings before the panel are adversary, and each party may
call and cross-examine witnesses and introduce evidence as at a
trial in the circuit court. 75 The panel, in accordance with applica-
ble substantive law as determined by the judge on the panel, deter-
mines the issue of liability and, if liability is found, the issue of fair
and just compensation for damages.76
plaintiff's life, payment shall continue until death or until life expectancy is reached. For
all future damages awarded to the victim for a definite number of years, payment shall
continue irrespective of the plaintiff's death. Id. at 2-1713. In the event that the future
damages awarded are $500,000 or more, the court may, upon a showing by the plaintiff
that his immediate needs are in excess of $250,000, award a greater lump sum award but
in no event shall any increase cause more than 50% of the equivalent lump sum award to
be distributed. Id. at 2-1708.
68. Id. at 2-114. This provision provides the only substantive right acquired by the
medical practitioner in the medical malpractice legislation.
69. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 58.2 to 58.10 (1975) (repealed 1979) with
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, TT 2-1013 to 2-1020 (1985). See supra notes 20-35 and accom-
panying text; infra notes 70-95 and accompanying text.
70. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, T 2-1013 (1985). Note that the 1985 legislature has
chosen the broader term "health professional" as compared to the 1975 legislature's
choice of "practicing physician." See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
71. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1014 (1985).
72. Id. The health professionals and attorneys chosen to be on the panel must be
licensed to practice in Illinois. Id.
73. Id. at T 2-1015.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 12-1016.
76. Id. at 1 2-1017.
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The effect of a panel's decision depends on the parties involved
in the suit. If the parties unanimously agree to be bound by the
determination of the panel, the panel's decision is binding and con-
clusive.77 If the parties are not in agreement with respect to the
panel's decision, a party has twenty-eight days to reject a unani-
mous panel decision before he is deemed to have accepted it.78 If a
party rejects a unanimous panel decision, or if the decision of the
panel is not unanimous, the panel judge conducts a pretrial confer-
ence and the case proceeds to trial.7 9 The determination of the
panel is not admissible at any subsequent trial.8 0
Although the 1975 and 1985 panel provisions are similar, the
effect of the Wright decision is clearly discernible in the 1985 Act.
Wright declared review panels unconstitutional because they in-
fringed on the plaintiffs' rights to "separation of powers" by vest-
ing judicial functions in nonjudicial personnel" and because they
violated the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected interests in trial
by jury. 2 In response to the separation of powers holding, the
1985 Act states that review panels shall follow the law of evidence
as determined by the judge.8 3 Additionally, it provides that the
panel shall make its determination according to the applicable sub-
stantive law as determined by the judge.8 4 Finally, the 1985 Act
provides that the panel shall state its conclusions of fact and the
judge his conclusions of law. 5 The 1985 Act thus separates the
judicial and nonjudicial functions of the panel in an attempt to pre-
clude a nonjudicial panel member from exerting any judicial
authority.
In response to the Wright finding that the 1975 panel provision
impaired plaintiffs' rights to trial by jury, the 1985 Act provides
77. Id. at 2-1018.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. But see Bernier v. Burris, No. 85-6627, slip op. at 5 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. Ill.
Dec. 19, 1985). "'Determinations' made by Review Panels have the force of judgments."
Id.; see infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
81. See Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 322, 324, 347 N.E.2d
736, 740-41 (1976). See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Wright case.
82. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 322, 324, 347 N.E.2d 736,
740-41 (1976).
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1016 (1985). Note that the nonjudicial members of
the panel have no authority to decide matters of evidence. Id.
84. Id. at 2-1017. Note that the judge alone determines the applicable substantive
law. Id,
85. Id. at 2-1016. Note that the judge still participates in fact-finding matters. It is
the nonjudicial members of the panel, the attorney and health professional, who are pre-
cluded from determining matters of law. Id.
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guidelines to ensure that a review panel will not unduly delay or
burden a plaintiff's access to the courts.8 6 Under the 1985 Act, a
court must, no later than 90 days after a complaint has been filed,
order a review panel to convene.87 Furthermore, the panel must
convene within 120 days of such order unless good cause is shown
for extending the date.8  Finally, the panel must render its decision
within 180 days of convening. 89 By contrast, the 1975 legislation
provided only that a judicial order to convene a panel was to issue
no sooner than 120 days nor later than one year after the com-
plaint was filed.9°
As a further assurance that the panel requirement will not un-
duly burden a plaintiff's access to the courts, the 1985 Act places
the costs of convening the review panel on the administrative office
of the Illinois courts rather than on the parties." However the
1985 Act, like the 1975 Act, 92 does impose the costs of an opposing
party's attorney and litigation fees on a party who rejects a unani-
mous panel decision and subsequently loses at trial. 93 Unlike the
1975 legislation, however, 94 the 1985 Act does not provide for judi-
cial discretion in imposing this penalty.95
Despite the fact that the 1985 Act reflected a legislative attempt
to cure the constitutional deficiencies of the 1975 legislation, the
1985 Act's constitutionality is presently at issue. On June 25,
86. ' See Id. at 2-1013. But see Bernier v. Burris, No. 85-6627, slip op. at 8 (Cir. Ct.
Cook Cty. Il. Dec. 19, 1985).
The time limitation for reaching a decision, imposed on the panel, could result
in the panel being discharged before it reached a decision, and is a denial of due
process of law, in violation of Article I, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution
and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Id.
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1013 (1985)
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 58.3 (1975) (repealed 1979).
91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1019 (1985). But note that parties must still pay for
the expenses and attorneys' fees involved in presenting a claim before the panel. Id.
92. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 58.9 (1975) (repealed 1979). See supra notes 34-35
and accompanying text.
93. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1019 (1985). If a party rejects a unanimous deci-
sion, and loses at a subsequent civil trial, the trial court
on motion of any prevailing party shall summarily tax to the rejecting party the
costs, reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses of the prevailing party incurred in
connection with the review panel and the trial. Such motion may not be made
or granted if both the prevailing and non-prevailing party have rejected the
determination of the medical review panel.
Id.
94. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 58.9 (1975) (repealed 1979).
95. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1019 (1985).
Loyola University Law Journal
1985, Bernice Bernier filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cook
County.96 The plaintiff alleged, in pertinent part, that the require-
ment of panel review as a condition precedent to a jury trial vio-
lated the plaintiff's right to trial by jury, as guaranteed under the
seventh amendment to the federal Constitution and section 13 of
article 1 of the Illinois constitution.97 Additionally, the complaint
alleged that the provision constituted special legislation in violation
of article IV, section 3 of the Illinois constitution and vested judi-
cial power in nonjudicial members, violating article VI, section 1 of
the Illinois constitution.98 Furthermore, since nonjudicial mem-
bers were to be paid out of funds received by the court administra-
tor for the operation of the courts, the plaintiff alleged that the
provision created fee officers in violation of Illinois constitution ar-
ticle VI, section 14.99 Finally, since the provision deprived medical
malpractice victims of a jury determination and imposed substan-
tial costs on any party rejecting a unanimous panel decision and
subsequently losing at trial, the complaint alleged that the provi-
sion violated the plaintiff's rights to due process and equal protec-
tion as guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment to the federal
Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Illinois constitution.Z°°
In Bernier v. Burris, the circuit court declared the provision un-
constitutional.10' The court found that the review panel provision
violated the plaintiff's rights to trial by jury and free access to the
courts, 10 2 and that the provision was also in violation of the equal
protection and due process provisions.'0 3 Moreover, the court
held, the panel review provisions impermissibly created special leg-
islation and fee officers and impermissibly vested judicial authority
in review panels."° An appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court is
currently pending.0 5
96. Bernier v. Burris, No. 85-6627 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. Ill. June 15, 1985).
97. Complaint at 10, Bernier v. Burris, No. 85-6627 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. Ill. June 15,
1985).
98. Id. at 11.
99. Id. at 13.
100. Id. at 11-12.
101. Bernier v. Burris, No. 85-6627, slip op. at 7-8 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. Ill. Dec. 19,
1985). Contrary to the legislature's findings, the court found no empirical evidence that a
medical malpractice insurance crisis exists in Illinois.
102. Id. at 7.
103. Id. at 7-8.
104. Id. at 7.
105. Bernier v. Burris, No. 85-6627 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. I11. Dec. 19, 1985), appeal
docketed, No. 62876 (I11. Sup. Ct. Dec. 30, 1985).
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III. ANALYSIS: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE REVIEW PANEL PROVISIONS
Although Illinois was one of the first states to enact a medical
malpractice reform act, legislatures in forty-eight states have en-
acted remedial legislation designed to end, or at least curtail, the
medical malpractice crisis."0 6 Many state courts have decided the
constitutionality of medical malpractice reform legislation, as did
the Illinois Supreme Court in the Wright case.' 7 Since the review
panel provision is one of the most important, and controversial,
provisions of any medical malpractice reform legislation, its consti-
tutionality has frequently been challenged. Review panels are usu-
ally challenged on three grounds: separation of powers, right to
trial by jury, and equal protection.
A. Separation of Powers
With respect to the separation of powers argument, the Illinois
Supreme Court struck down the 1975 Act because the act imper-
missibly vested judicial authority in nonjudicial panel members.0 8
Since the Wright decision, plaintiffs in other states have often chal-
lenged medical malpractice legislation on similar grounds.0 9
106. See supra note 6; see also Chapman, Are the New States' Malpractice Laws Work-
ing to Protect You?, 8 LEGAL ASPECTS OF MED. PRAC. No. 5, at 41 (May 1980) (discuss-
ing medical malpractice legislation).
107. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Kenyon v. Hammer, 142
Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977);
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 36 Cal.
3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr 671 (1984); Barme v. Wood, 37 Cal. 3d 174, 689
P.2d 446, 207 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1984); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555
P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); State ex rel. Schneider v. Liggett, 223
Kan. 610, 576 P.2d 221 (1978); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978); Attor-
ney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373
Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977); State ex rel. Glennon Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner,
583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187 (Mont. 1981); Prendergast v.
Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 493, 697 P.2d
493 (1984); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp.,
67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 424 N.E.2d 586 (1981); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d
491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122
(1976).
108. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 322, 347 N.E. 2d 736,
740 (1976).
109. See Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978) (Maryland
panel provision challenged as constitutionally infirm for vesting judicial power in a nonju-
dicial body); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187 (Mont. 1981) (Montana Panel Act chal-
lenged as violating prohibitions against unlawful delegation of judicial and legislative
power and infringing on the separation of powers doctrine); see also Suchit v. Baxt, 176
N.J. Super. 407, 423 A.2d 670 (1980); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491,
261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
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These cases indicate that courts consider two factors in deciding
separation of powers challenges: first, whether an act impermissi-
bly vests judicial functions in nonjudicial members, "0 and second,
whether the act makes the panel decision final and binding on the
parties. 1
The Illinois legislature has resolved many of the separation of
powers problems found in the 1975 Act. For example, the 1985
Act clearly separates the powers of the judiciary from the duties of
the nonjudicial members by having the judge decide all matters of
law and the panel all matters of fact."I2 The panel is only entitled
to apply the law as determined by the judge on the panel." 13 Fur-
thermore, the 1985 Act provides for a trial de novo following a
panel proceeding."I4 The 1985 Act does allow the parties, by unan-
imous written agreement, to be bound by the panel determina-
tion.1 5 However, nothing in the act requires the parties to accept
the panel decision." 6 The act does not prevent a medical malprac-
tice victim from filing his claim in a circuit court or taking his case
to a jury.' ' The only possible legal consequence of the medical
review panel determination is that one of the parties may have to
pay the other's fees. 1 8 However, this provision does not in any
manner affect the substantive outcome of the case. As a result, the
panel decision is not binding on the parties, since they may either
reject or accept the finding. In light of recent cases, which have
upheld panel proceedings as being neither final nor binding,' '9 the
110. See, e.g., Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 322, 347 N.E.
2d 736, 740 (1976). But see Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 290, 385 A.2d 57,
66 (1978) (finds Wright reasoning unpersuasive; the mere performance by a nonjudicial
body of a function that would in another context be considered purely judicial cannot
alone support a conclusion that the separation of powers principle has been violated).
111. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 287, 385 A.2d 57, 61 (1978)
(panel proceeding does not impermissibly transgress separation of powers doctrine be-
cause parties are not bound by the panel decision and the panel cannot enforce its deci-
sion); Linder v. Smith, 629 P. 2d 1187, 1194 (Mont. 1981) (no violation of separation of
powers doctrine because panel decisions are advisory and unenforceable by the panel).
112. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1016 (1985).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2-1018.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2-1019.
119. See Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 287-88, 385 A.2d 57, 63 (1978);
Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Mont. 1981); Suchit v. Baxt, 176 N.J. Super. 407,
426-27, 423 A.2d 670, 680 (1980); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491,
521-22, 261 N.W.2d 434, 448 (1978).
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Illinois act should withstand the two-pronged separation of powers
analysis.
B. Right to Trial by Jury
Plaintiffs challenging review panel provisions often argue that a
panel proceeding before trial creates an extra financial burden and
long delays, thus infringing on the plaintiff's rights to trial by jury
and free access to the courts."12 Most courts reviewing these chal-
lenges have found that the "reasonable" burden imposed on the
plaintiff by the panel proceeding is not unconstitutional in light of
the legislative goals.12" ' However, some courts have invalidated
medical malpractice legislation on the basis that it imposes "unrea-
sonable" burdens on the plaintiffs.'2 2 Invalidation usually occurs if
an act appears to impose substantial financial burdens and exces-
sive time delays on a plaintiff, 23 or if an act which has been in
effect for a number of years is proved ineffective. 124
120. See, e.g., Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Aldana v.
Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980); Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374,
404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978);
Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187 (Mont. 1981); Suchit v. Baxt, 176 N.J. Super. 407, 423
A.2d 670 (1980); Simon v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio 1976);
Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wil-
kie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
121. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 304, 385 A.2d 57, 75 (1978)
("The trial by jury ... may be subjected to new modes, and even rendered more expensive,
if the public interest demands such alteration.") (emphasis in original); Linder v. Smith,
629 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Mont. 1981) (requiring plaintiffs to begin the jury trial process by
submitting their claims to a panel is a permissible interference with the right to trial by
jury).
122. See, e.g., State ex rel. Glennon Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107,
110 (Mo. 1979) (citing People ex rel. Christiansen v. Connell, 2 Ill. 2d 232, 118 N.E.2d
262 (1954)) (panel proceedings impose a useless and arbitrary delay upon a plaintiff's
right of access to the courts). However, the Missouri statute provided for panel proceed-
ings prior to the filing of a claim.
123. See, e.g., State ex rel. Glennon Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107,
110 (Mo. 1979) (requirement of panel proceeding before filing of claim unconstitutional);
Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 587, 570 P.2d 744, 754 (1977) (provision requiring
pretrial bond from party challenging a panel's decision unconstitutional).
124. In Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 393-96, 421 A.2d 190, 195 (1980), the
court invalidated the state's panel provision after reviewing data which revealed the inef-
fectiveness of the legislation. The evidence showed that from April 6, 1976 to May 31,
1980, a total of 3,452 cases had been filed with the administrator; only 936 of these cases
had been resolved, settled or terminated; 73 percent of cases filed had not been resolved.
Six of the original 48 cases filed in 1976 remained unresolved despite the passage of four
years. As of May 31, 1980, 38 percent of the claims filed in 1977, 65 percent of the claims
filed in 1978 and 85 percent of the cases filed in 1979 remained unresolved. Id.; see also
Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231, 236 (Fla. 1980) (court used statistical analysis in decid-
ing constitutionality of statute). But see Simon v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, 355
N.E.2d 903, 908 (Ohio 1976). The Simon court declared the panel provision unconstitu-
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For example, the Arizona Supreme Court found that the imposi-
tion of a $2,000 bond prior to the filing of a medical malpractice
claim denied parties access to the courts. 125 The bond requirement,
according to the court, burdened a nonindigent's access to the
court and denied an indigent access altogether. Because of this im-
permissible financial burden, the court declared the bond provision
unconstitutional. 126 Subsequent case law, however, has usually up-
held such legislation, despite allegations of unreasonable financial
burdens and excessive delays. Courts supporting the legislation
often rely on provisions which limit the amount of costs to be as-
sessed against a party or which provide the courts with discretion-
ary authority in assessing costs.
1 27
Since the Illinois legislation is much too recent to be analyzed in
the context of effectiveness, the 1985 Act must be reviewed in
terms of reasonableness. The Illinois legislature has established
certain guidelines to ensure that medical malpractice review is per-
formed efficiently and at a minimum cost to the parties. The con-
vention and decision of a panel must occur within a certain time
period.1 28 Furthermore, the cost of the panel proceeding is to be
charged to the state.129 However, in one significant respect, the
Illinois legislature has imposed a substantial financial burden on
parties to medical malpractice actions. If a party rejects a unani-
mous decision of the panel, continues to trial and loses at trial, that
party, upon a motion brought by the prevailing opponent, bears
the burden of paying the opposing party's attorney and litigation
fees for both the panel review and trial.' 30 The provision does not
impose a ceiling on the potential costs involved and it does not
provide for judicial discretion in application. The provision ap-
tional outright because the admissibility of arbitration panel findings at a subsequent trial
violated a plaintiff's right to trial by jury. Id. However, the Ohio court applied a strict
scrutiny analysis in reviewing the legislation. Id. at 906. Since the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review for medical malpractice legislation has been rejected by a majority of
courts, the impact of this decision is negligible. See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying
text.
125. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 585-86, 570 P.2d 744, 754 (1977).
126. Id.
127. Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 383, 404 N.E.2d 585, 592
(1980); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 652, 369 N.E.2d 985, 991 (1977).
128. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1013 (1985) provides that a court must issue an
order to convene a review panel no later than 90 days after the parties are at issue on the
pleadings. A panel must convene within 120 days of such order unless good cause is
shown for extending that date. Id. Finally, the panel must render its decision within 180
days of convening. Id.
129. Id. at 2-1019.
130. Id.
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plies not only to a party who rejects a panel decision against him,
but also to a party who rejects a decision in his favor because of a
disagreement with the damage award. The provision does not,
however, apply if both parties reject the unanimous panel decision.
To determine the constitutionality of this cost-shifting provision,
the reasonableness of imposing such a financial burden on medical
malpractice parties should be balanced against the state interests
involved. 13,
Through the use of screening panels, Illinois hopes to alleviate
frivolous medical malpractice claims, expedite the settlement of
meritorious suits and preserve the judicial system for meritorious
claims. 132 The cost-shifting provision would have the effect of alle-
viating frivolous medical malpractice suits from the courts if the
provision affected only those parties who unanimously lose on the
merits at the panel proceeding. Presumably, the possibility of pay-
ing the other party's attorney and litigation fees should .effectively
dissuade a plaintiff with a frivolous medical malpractice claim
from going to trial. However, the provision also dissuades those
parties who succeed at the panel level but reject the unanimous
decision because of disagreement with the damage award. 133 If
such a party continues to trial and subsequently loses, he too is
obligated to finance the opposing party's attorney and litigation
costs. As a result, the provision has the potential of burdening
meritorious claims.
Since the potential costs of the provision are severe,' 34 and since
meritorious claims may be burdened in the process of application,
the provision is unlikely to withstand a right-to-jury challenge as
written. However, the Illinois provision may be upheld as consti-
tutional if the legislature adopts any one of three policies. First,
the legislature may limit the provision's application to only those
parties rejecting a unanimous panel decision against them on the
merits. Second, the legislature may place a ceiling on the amount
of costs that can be shifted.' Finally, the legislature may give
131. See Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 298, 385 A.2d 57, 75 (1980).
132. See TASK FORCE, supra note 54, at 4.
133. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, T 2-1019 (1985). Note that the cost-shifting provi-
sion does not apply where both parties reject a unanimous decision in one party's favor.
Id.
134. Opening Salvos Fired in Malpractice Challenge, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Oct. 8, 1985,
at 1, col. 1. In 61 medical malpractice cases tried in a two-year period, the defense costs
averaged more than $55,000. Id. at col. 6. In one case, defense costs totalled $446,025.
Id.
135. State acts which place additional financial burdens on medical malpractice par-
ties have been upheld where the act places a limit on the amount of costs assessed against
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courts discretion in imposing such costs on any particular party. 136
By adopting any one of these three policies, Illinois would assure
medical malpractice plaintiffs that any financial burdens incurred
in the panel proceeding would be reasonable.
C. Equal Protection
Finally, screening panels are frequently challenged on equal pro-
tection grounds. 137 Plaintiffs allege that such provisions improp-
erly single out victims of medical negligence - as distinct from
victims of other kinds of negligence - for harsh treatment by re-
stricting the means by which they may sue. 138 In recent years, in-
creasing attention has been paid to judicial analysis of equal
protection challenges to medical malpractice legislation. 139 In con-
sidering the constitutionality of a statute on an equal protection
basis, courts have adopted three standards of review: the strict
scrutiny test, the rational basis test and the means scrutiny test.
Under the strict scrutiny approach, challenged legislation is not
sustainable unless the party defending the statute shows a "com-
pelling state interest" and the necessity of the regulation to
achievement of the legislative objective. 14° The strict scrutiny test
a party. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-10 (Burns 1980), which provided that compensa-
tion costs for panel members were to be placed on the party winning at the panel proceed-
ing; costs were not to exceed $1,250 plus reasonable travel expenses. The
constitutionality of the provision was upheld in Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind.
374, 383, 404 N.E.2d 585, 592 (1980). The statute has since been amended to allow
maximum compensation costs of $1,750. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-10 (Burns Cum. Supp.
1985).
136. One court has upheld medical malpractice legislation where the legislation pro-
vides the court with discretionary authority to impose financial costs on parties. See
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60B (Michie/Law Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1985), which pro-
vides that a losing plaintiff at a panel proceeding may pursue his claim at trial only after
posting a $2,000 bond; however, the court has discretion to reduce the amount. The
provision was upheld in Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 652, 369 N.E.2d 985,
991 (1977).
137. See, e.g., Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Lacy v.
Green, 428 A.2d 1171 (Del. Super. 1981); Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind.
374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978);
Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187 (Mont. 1981); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d
483, 424 N.E.2d 586; Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983); State ex rel. Strykow-
ski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
138. See Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 932, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980).
139. See Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1172-73 (5th Cir. 1979) (dis-
cussing equal protection tests); Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 166-
67, 695 P.2d 665, 694-95, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 397-98 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (criticizing
majority's adoption of rational basis test), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985); see also
Redish, supra note 1, at 771-72 (discussing various tests and their effectiveness).
140. Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1172 (5th Cir. 1979).
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is usually adopted where a suspect class or fundamental right is
involved.' 4' Most state courts have rejected a strict scrutiny test
when reviewing medical malpractice legislation because medical
malpractice victims are not a suspect class and because no "funda-
mental" rights are infringed by the legislation. 142
State medical malpractice legislation has most frequently been
tested under the second level of analysis, the rational basis stan-
dard.1 43 Under this test, the constitutional requirement of equal
protection is violated "only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objective."' 44
In applying this standard, courts will accept the legislative deter-
mination of relevancy as long as it is reasonable, even though it
may be disputed, debated or opposed by strong contrary
arguments. 145
141. Id.
142. Id.; see, e.g., Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 391-92, 404 N.E.2d
585, 597 (1980).
The classification of tort claimants is based upon their status as patients and
their injuries having arisen from a breach of duty owed them by a health care
provider. The classification of health care provider is based upon the services
they render. Neither classification involves a suspect classification such as race,
wealth, lineage, alienage or illegitimacy. And a requirement such as this that a
party engage in processes for improving the quality of evidence for settlement
and litigation purposes does not impinge upon the exercise of a fundamental
right such as voting, procreation, interstate travel, or to present a defense in a
criminal action.
Accord Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1173-74 (5th Cir. 1979); Everett v.
Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256, 1266 (La. 1978); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274,
308-11, 385 A.2d 57, 77-78 (1978); Comment, The Constitutional Considerations of Medi-
cal Malpractice Screening Panels, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 161, 171 (1977).
143. See Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256, 1267 (1978) (under rational basis test,
pretrial screening of medical malpractice claims is not an unreasonable response to the
medical malpractice crisis, nor are the provisions especially far reaching); State ex rel.
Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 509-10, 261 N.W.2d 434, 443 (1978) (under ra-
tional basis test, the "public has an important interest in the quality of health care, and
the legislature's efforts to promote that interest cannot be said to be unreasonable"); At-
torney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 268, 313, 385 A.2d 57, 79 (1978) ("[I]t is inappropriate
for a court to preclude the legislature from attempting to resolve a problem in a particu-
lar manner simply because the intended results cannot be definitively demonstrated in
advance."); Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 121, 394 A.2d 932,
940 (1978) ("In reaching our conclusion today we are relying upon the legislative judg-
ment that the procedures provided for under the Act will substantially expedite the dispo-
sition of malpractice cases in this jurisdiction."); Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 806
(Fla. 1976) ("Even though the pre-litigation burden cast upon the claimant reaches the
outer limits of constitutional tolerance, we do not deem it sufficient to void the medical
malpractice law.").
144. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
145. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111-12 (1979).
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For example, in Parker v. Children's Hospital of Philadelphia,146
the court, under a rational basis test, upheld the Pennsylvania
panel review provision'47 even though some evidence indicated that
panel procedures did not provide an expeditious disposition of
cases. 148 Two years after the Parker decision, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, applying a higher level of scrutiny, declared the
state's medical malpractice panel procedure unconstitutional. 49
Due to the delays involved in processing medical malpractice
claims under the prescribed procedures, the court found that the
Pennsylvania act resulted in an oppressive delay and an impermis-
sible infringement on the constitutional right to trial by jury. 50 By
initially using the rational basis test, the Pennsylvania lower court
did not give the act the judicial scrutiny it deserved. 5 ' As a result,
the court unnecessarily denied medical malpractice litigants the
right to trial by jury.15 2
In recent years, another level of equal protection analysis has
appeared: a "means scrutiny" test.'53 To uphold a statute under
this test, the court must find that the state's interest is important
and that the means adopted to serve that interest are "reasonable,
but not arbitrary."'' 54 While the means scrutiny test gives a legisla-
146. 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
147. Id. at 121, 394 A.2d at 940. "It is an accepted principle of constitutional law
that deference to a co-equal branch of government requires that we accord a reasonable
period of. . .time to test the effectiveness of legislation." Id.
148. Id. Plaintiffs introduced in evidence the fact that, after two years of operation,
Pennsylvania panel proceedings were causing unjustified delays in the processing of
claims. Id.
149. Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980).
150. Id. at 396, 421 A.2d at 196.
151. Id. at 398-99, 421 A.2d at 197 (Larsen, J., concurring). "I do not believe that
deference requires sticking one's head in the sand to avoid difficult constitutional
problems when confronted with evidence of their existence and magnitude." Id.; see also
Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 866, 555 P.2d 399, 406 (1976). "It is
apparent that the practical effect of the application of (the rational basis) test . . . is to
substantially remove the courts from inquiry into the ends sought to be served by a legis-
lative action." Id.
152. Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 397, 421 A.2d 190, 196 (1980) (Larsen, J.,
concurring). "I regret, however, that justice has been so long denied those litigants who
have been bogged down in this 'unworkable mess.'" Id. (quoting Parker, 483 Pa. at 132,
394 A.2d at 934 (Larsen, J., concurring) (footnote omitted)).
153. The United States Supreme Court has applied the means scrutiny test to cases
involving classifications based upon gender and illegitimacy. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439
U.S. 259, 265 (1979) (illegitimacy); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (gender). However,
state courts interpreting state constitutions are not confined to federal constitutional stan-
dards and are free to grant individuals more rights than the federal constitution requires.
Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 932, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980).
154. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
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ture more deference than the strict scrutiny approach, it requires a
legislature to give greater justification for a statutory classification
than is required for a rational basis analysis.'55 In applying the
means scrutiny analysis, courts must examine carefully the factual
assumptions that underlie the asserted connection between the
means adopted by the legislature and the goals which it seeks to
achieve. 5 6 Four state courts have adopted this standard of review
when considering the constitutionality of state medical malprac-
tice legislation. 57
For example, in Arneson v. Olson158 the means scrutiny test was
applied to determine the constitutionality of a North Dakota stat-
ute which, among other things, limited damages recoverable by
medical malpractice victims to $300,000. Under the means scru-
tiny test, 59 the court required that a close correspondence exist
between the statutory classification and the legislative goals of the
act. 16 The court found that the legislative goals included the en-
surance of availability of competent medical and hospital services
at reasonable cost, the elimination of expenses involved in nonmer-
155. Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1173 (5th Cir. 1979).
156. Redish, supra note 1, at 772.
157. The means scrutiny test, in the context of medical malpractice legislation, was
first adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho
859, 871, 555 P.2d 399, 411 (1976). Expressly rejecting the rational basis standard of
review as "blind adherence and over-indulgence," the court found that the legislation
deserved stricter scrutiny since it was discriminatory on its face and lacked a connection
between its classification and its intended statutory purpose. Id.; see also Arneson v.
Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978) (for equal protection purposes, North Dakota
courts require a "close correspondence between statutory classifications and legislative
goals"); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 931, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980) (the test is
"whether the challenged classifications are reasonable and have a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation"); Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind.
374, 392, 404 N.E.2d 585, 597 (1980) (the standard is "whether the legislative classifica-
tion is based upon substantial distinctions with reference to the subject matter, or is man-
ifestly unjust or unreasonable").
158. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
159. The Arneson court applied the means scrutiny test because it found that the
medical malpractice provisions were similar to an automobile guest statute (limiting re-
covery to certain tort victims) to which the court had applied a means scrutiny approach.
Id. at 133. Other rationales for the use of means scrutiny include: (1) the belief that the
rights of medical malpractice victims are sufficiently important to require that restrictions
on such rights be subjected to more rigorous judicial scrutiny, see Carson v. Maurer, 120
N.H. 925, 930, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980); and (2) the belief that means scrutiny analysis
must be applied to statutes involving invidiously discriminatory classifications. See Jones
v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 968, 555 P.2d 399, 407 (1976). At least one court
has offered no rationale for application of the test to medical malpractice legislation other
than its general application in equal protection analysis. See Johnson v. Saint Vincent
Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 391-92, 404 N.E.2d 585, 597 (1980).
160. Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 133.
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itorious malpractice claims, the provision of adequate compensa-
tion to patients with meritorious claims, and the encouragement of
physicians to enter the practice of medicine in North Dakota.' 61
The court next examined whether the limitation on recovery by
seriously injured victims of medical negligence promoted any of
these aims. 162  In an independent examination of the legislative
facts used in adopting the statute, the court did not find any justifi-
cation for the limitations imposed on malpractice victims. 163  In
fact, the court found substantial evidence negating the premise that
a medical malpractice insurance crisis existed in North Dakota.' 64
Based on this judicial analysis of the legislative facts underlying
the malpractice act, the court invalidated the legislation on an
equal protection basis. 165
The 1975 Illinois legislation was challenged on a mixture of
equal protection and due process grounds. 16 6 Although the Illinois
Supreme Court did not expressly state, in Wright, that equal pro-
tection questions were at issue, both the language and result of that
decision indicate that a strict scrutiny analysis was used. 16 7 As pre-
viously stated, the strict judicial scrutiny initially applied to medi-
cal malpractice legislation introduced during the 1970's is no
longer applied by state courts. 168 A new standard of review must
be adopted by Illinois courts reviewing medical malpractice legisla-
tion. Because of the importance of the public and state interests
involved and the inadequacy of the rational basis test in protecting
the interests of malpractice victims, Illinois courts should adopt
the means scrutiny test.
Applying the means scrutiny analysis to the Illinois legislation,
the court must determine whether a close correspondence exists
161. Id. at 135.
162. Id. at 135-36.
163. Id. at 136.
164. The court found, contrary to the legislature's belief that South Dakota's insur-
ance premiums were much too high, that one of the largest insurance companies was
accepting applications at rates lower than the national average. Id. at 136. In fact, the
court found, insurance premiums in North Dakota were the sixth lowest in the United
States. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Comment, supra note 13, at 871 (discusses the Wright decision at length;
concludes that the decision was made on a mixture of equal protection and due process
grounds).
167. See Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736
(1976) (in determining constitutionality of statute, court did not discuss rationality of
legislation; instead, court focused on interests of the parties affected); Comment, supra
note 13, at 873-74.
168. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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between the statutory classifications and the legislative goals. 69
Under this approach, the court must independently examine the
legislative facts used to justify the act. Through the use of screen-
ing panels, the Illinois legislature hopes to alleviate frivolous mal-
practice lawsuits, expedite the settlement of meritorious
malpractice suits and preserve the judicial system for those cases
that truly belong in the courts. 7 o By eliminating frivolous medical
malpractice claims from the courts, the provision attempts to de-
crease the social and economic costs of the medical malpractice
crisis in Illinois.' 7 1
In an attempt to promote these goals, the legislature has deter-
mined that medical malpractice claimants must, prior to an adjudi-
cation of their case in court, submit their claim to a medical
malpractice panel for review. 72 A decision reached by the review
panel is not binding on the parties and is not admissible as evidence
at a subsequent trial. 173 However, the act does require that if a
unanimous panel decision is rejected by a disappointed claimant
and that claimant subsequently loses at trial, the court, upon mo-
tion by the prevailing party, must summarily charge the claimant
with the opposing party's litigation fees.' 74 The issue, for Illinois
courts, is whether the creation of review panels with fee-shifting
provisions corresponds closely enough to the Illinois legislature's
goals to satisfy a means scrutiny test.17 5
It is undeniable that one of the results of the review panel proce-
dure will be the elimination of frivolous medical malpractice
claims. Litigants who realize that their claims are without merit
will not continue to trial and will either dismiss or settle their
cases, consistent with legislative goals. The settlement or dismissal
169. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978).
170. TASK FORCE, supra note 54, at 4.
171. Id.
172. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1013 to 2-1020 (1985).
173. Id. at 2-1018.
174. Id. at 2-1019. The provision does not apply where both parties reject a unani-
mous panel decision. Id.
175. Basic to the adoption of the medical malpractice review panel legislation is the
presumption that a medical malpractice crisis exists in Illinois. An Illinois court recently
declared the Illinois medical malpractice legislation unconstitutional, primarily because
the court did not find sufficient empirical data to support a finding that a medical mal-
practice insurance crisis exists in Illinois. Bernier v. Burris, No. 85-6627, slip op. at 2
(Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. Ill. Dec. 19, 1985). Contrary to this decision, the author remains
persuaded that a crisis exists in Illinois. It is undisputed that insurance premiums and
suits are increasing and that medical malpractice companies are either leaving Illinois or
limiting recoveries on their policies. TASK FORCE, supra note 54, at 4, 30. Consistent
with this evidence, the article proceeds on the presumption that Illinois is undergoing a
medical malpractice crisis.
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of frivolous claims will decrease costs of litigation, thereby alleviat-
ing some of the problems causing the medical malpractice crisis.
Since the creation of medical review panels closely corresponds to
legislative goals, the panels themselves appear to be constitutional
under a means scrutiny analysis.
However, it appears that the fee-shifting component will not
withstand equal protection scrutiny. Although it may be argued
that the fee-shifting provision will force parties to reconsider the
merits of their claims and thus encourage the settlement or dismis-
sal of frivolous claims, it is likely that many meritorious claims will
be burdened by the provision as well. The provision may impose
burdens on parties who have meritorious claims but reject
favorable unanimous panel decisions because of a disagreement
with the damage award. Additionally, the provision may burden
meritorious claims simply because some parties will decide not to
proceed to trial because they cannot afford to pay the opposing
party's litigation costs in the event of an unfavorable verdict. Since
the provision may discourage meritorious as well as frivolous
claims, it does not closely correspond to legislative goals and
should therefore be invalidated under a means scrutiny analysis.
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1975 Illinois, recognizing that a medical malpractice crisis
existed in the state, passed legislation to alleviate some of the
problems caused by the crisis. Among its several provisions, the
act created medical malpractice panels to review claims prior to
litigation at trial. In 1976, the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated
the legislation on constitutional grounds. Ten years have passed
and the legislature has once again declared that a medical malprac-
tice crisis exists in Illinois. Once again legislation, including a pro-
vision for creation of medical malpractice review panels, has been
adopted. And once again the Illinois Supreme Court must evalu-
ate the constitutionality of the legislation.
The review panel requirement found in the 1985 Act does im-
pose burdens on medical malpractice claimants. However, the
court must determine, in light of legislative goals, whether the bur-
dens imposed by the legislation are so unreasonable or excessive
that they infringe on the constitutional rights of the claimants.
The medical malpractice review panels established by the Illinois
legislature do not appear to excessively burden a claimant's consti-
tutional rights to separation of powers, trial by jury or equal pro-
tection. Therefore the review panels are a possible vehicle for the
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alleviation of frivolous medical malpractice claims and the reduc-
tion in costs of medical malpractice litigation in Illinois.
However, the fee-shifting provision associated with the panel re-
view unconstitutionally limits a claimant's rights to trial by jury
and equal protection. The provision burdens meritorious as well as
frivolous claims and is inconsistent with legislative goals. Since the
fee-shifting provision may be severed from the panel require-
ment, 6 the balance of the provision should be upheld as constitu-
tional so that review panels can be used to further the legislature's
attempt to solve the medical malpractice crisis.
THERESE DYNIA
176. Even if the provision is finally declared unconstitutional at the state supreme
court level, this will not render the entire act unconstitutional. According to the sever-
ability clause of the Illinois Revised Statutes, the invalidity of one section of an act does
not render invalid other provisions or applications of the act which can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1, 1032 (1985).
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